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One taxpayer’s economic
development incentive
is often another’s
discriminatory tax

F

or years, there has been a growing controversy

over the wisdom and constitutionality of state and local

tax incentives designed to encourage businesses to locate or

substantially increase their operations in a state.
State and local officials, as well as multistate businesses, often
say these incentives are crucial to bolstering economic development
in their area, while others contend these incentives amount to
discriminatory state taxation favoring in-state over out-of-state
investment in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
With every state in the nation offering some type of tax incentive to encourage in-state economic development and with lawsuits across the nation testing the validity of these efforts, many
are calling for clearer guidelines from Congress regarding the
matter. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent dismissal of the
challenge to Ohio’s tax incentives in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler,
on the ground that the taxpayers did not have “standing” to
bring the suit, has done nothing to resolve the underlying substantive question of the incentives’ constitutionality.
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Walter Hellerstein, the School of Law’s Shackelford Distinguished Professor of Taxation and who is generally regarded as
the nation’s leading legal academic authority on state and local taxation, was asked to provide testimony on these issues at a
U.S. Senate hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance earlier this year.
Hellerstein also testified on this topic before a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee last year and provided an overview of the American debate to the United Kingdom’s Treasury Department, which faces similar issues in relation to Member
States of the European Union seeking to encourage economic growth and productivity in their respective countries.
Below you will find a modified version of Hellerstein’s testimony before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the
Committee on Finance.
Why Congress should draw a
line between appropriate economic development incentives
and inappropriate state tax
discrimination
It is not an overstatement to characterize the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine imposing
restraints on state taxation of interstate commerce as a “quagmire.”
Indeed, almost half a century ago the
U.S. Supreme Court itself described the
doctrine that way,1 and things have not gotten much better.2
Moreover, in no context is the confusion and uncertainty created by the court’s
Commerce Clause doctrine more profound
than in the domain of state tax incentives for
economic development.
As I testified last year before a House subcommittee looking into the Cuno problem,3
perhaps the one point on which virtually
all observers would agree is that “the law in
this area is indeterminate” and that, “[l]less
charitably put, it is a mess, albeit a mess
that keeps many lawyers and law professors
busy.”4
The Cuno case, of course, is a poster child
for this “mess.” How can anyone explain, as
the Cuno case held, how (a) an income tax
credit to attract business to a state violates
the Commerce Clause while (b) a property
tax abatement to attract that same business
to the state does not?5 But Cuno is just the
tip of the iceberg.
Important questions
There are literally hundreds of state tax
incentives enacted for economic development purposes that arguably fall on one
side or the other of the line the court has
drawn between permissible and impermissible inducements. Whether they fall on
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the right side or the wrong side of the line
depends on an inquiry into such questions
as whether the measure is:
• a permissible direct subsidy of domestic industry that "'does not ordinarily
run afoul' of the negative Commerce
Clause"6; or
• an incentive falling within the court's
recognition that its decisions "do[ ]
not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to encourage the
growth and development of intrastate
commerce and industry"7; or
• an incentive designed to achieve that
same objective - "to encourage the
growth and development of intrastate
commerce and industry" - but that
"forecloses tax-neutral decisions"8; or
• an incentive that "provid[es] a direct
commercial advantage to local business."9

Because the answers to these questions
are often unclear, in many cases it is anyone's
guess whether a particular economic development measure falls on the right or wrong
side of that line.
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court is struggling with the question of
whether the state's property tax exemption
for airlines that operate "hub facilities" in
the state violates the dormant Commerce
Clause,10 a question that the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals certified to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court because it "presents issues of
statewide and national importance involving
the ability of the state to provide tax incentives for businesses to locate, upgrade, or
remain in the state."11
While perhaps not of the same pressing
importance, except to my state and local tax
students to whom I gave the problem as an
examination question last semester, is the
question of the constitutionality of Georgia's
headquarters credit for new investment in
the state.12 I could have chosen a similar
example from virtually any other state.

Resulting taxation issues
The problem created by this uncertainty
for taxpayers and taxing authorities alike is
self-evident.
Corporate taxpayers who have reasonably relied on these economic development
incentives in the past have no assurance that
these provisions will survive a Commerce
Clause challenge and thereby deprive them
of benefits on which they may have made
locational and budgetary decisions.
Moreover, this uncertainty has a highly
unsettling impact on future decision-making
regarding industrial location.
State taxing authorities whose incentive
provisions may be vulnerable to attack likewise face difficult administrative decisions in
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determining how to redress the discrimination, especially in light of the constitutional
requirement that those who have been the
victim of unconstitutional state tax discrimination are entitled to “meaningful backwardlooking relief.”13
The state budgetary implications of this
requirement can also be daunting.
Accordingly, wholly apart from any question of whether state tax incentives are wise
as a matter of policy - an issue on which
others are better positioned to comment and
to which my testimony is not directed - the
existing indeterminacy of the law governing the constitutionality of these incentives
under the Commerce Clause calls for a
solution.

leave us in the “mess” we are in.
Wholly apart from the wisdom or effectiveness of state tax incentives or the defensibility of various competing readings of
the dormant Commerce Clause that may
be advanced, failure by Congress to act will

Congress should act
That solution will not come from the
U.S. Supreme Court or from other courts
that are bound to follow its guidance. As
Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter observed
nearly 50 years ago:

that is discernible

At best, this Court can only act negatively; it can determine whether a
specific state tax is imposed in violation of the Commerce Clause. Such
decisions must necessarily depend on
the application of rough and ready
legal concepts. We cannot make a
detailed inquiry into the incidence of
diverse economic burdens in order to
determine the extent to which such
burdens conflict with the necessities
of national economic life. Neither
can we devise appropriate standards
for dividing up national revenue on
the basis of more or less abstract
principles of constitutional law, which
cannot be responsive to the subtleties of the interrelated economies of
Nation and State.
The problem calls for solution by
devising a congressional policy.
Congress alone can provide for a full
and thorough canvassing of the multitudinous and intricate factors which
compose the problem of the taxing
freedom of the States and the needed
limits on such state taxing power.14
In short, the problem raised by Cuno is
broader than Cuno itself.
Failure by Congress to act on the underlying issue raised by Cuno will effectively
14
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“… we are all better
off if Congress
draws a clear line

to all than if we are
left to the vagaries
of the judicial process
that has created the
uncertainty and
controversy that
we face today.”
- Shackelford Professor
Walter Hellerstein

assure continuing uncertainty and, most
probably, inconsistency in judicial determinations of the validity of state tax incentives.
To reiterate what I said to a House subcommittee last year: “However Congress
may resolve the ultimate question of what
types of tax incentives represent appropriate
measures to encourage economic development, we are all better off if Congress draws
a clear line that is discernible to all than if we
are left to the vagaries of the judicial process
that has created the uncertainty and controversy that we face today.”15

How Congress should draw
the line between acceptable
economic development incentives and unacceptable state
tax discrimination
If Congress decides to legislate in this
area and to draw a line between acceptable
economic development incentives and unacceptable state tax discrimination, my principal recommendation is simple: be careful.
I say that for the following reason: one
person’s “economic development incentive”
is often another person’s “discriminatory
tax.”
New York’s “economic development
incentive” to attract sales to the New York
exchanges was a “discriminatory tax” to the
Boston Stock Exchange that viewed the
incentive as diverting economic activity from
the Boston exchange, a view with which the
U.S. Supreme Court concurred.16
Hawaii’s “economic development incentive” for its fledging wine industry was a
“discriminatory tax” to sellers of alcoholic
beverages produced in other states, a view
with which the U.S. Supreme Court concurred.17
New York’s “economic development
incentive” for businesses involved in export
shipment from New York was a “discriminatory tax” for those making export shipments
from other states, a view with which the U.S.
Supreme Court concurred.18
And Ohio’s “economic development
incentive” for gasohol produced in the state
was a “discriminatory tax” to those who
produced gasohol in other states, a view with
which the U.S. Supreme Court concurred.19
Consequently, in drawing the line
between acceptable and unacceptable economic development incentives, Congress
must act with great care to assure that it is
neither approving as “economic development incentives” provisions that, on further
reflection, constitute unwarranted “state tax
discrimination” nor, alternatively, that it is
not condemning as “state tax discrimination”
provisions that, on further reflection, constitute permissible “economic development
incentives.”
Let me provide you with one recent
example of the delicate task that Congress
faces.
Recently, the Missouri House of
Representatives passed by a resounding
152-1 margin an exemption from Missouri
sales taxes for “all sales of new motor vehicles
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assembled and sold in the state of Missouri
after January 1, 2007.”20
The bill was obviously enacted with the
wholly laudable and understandable purpose
of encouraging economic development in
Missouri by eliminating the tax on motor
vehicles assembled in the state.
But it does not take a Nobel-prize winning economist to appreciate the implications of this legislation for the sale in
Missouri of automobiles manufactured in
Illinois, Ohio or Michigan.
The question Congress faces, then, is
how to draw the appropriate line between
Cuno-type incentives, which many believe
are appropriate, and the Missouri incentive,
which, I will venture to presume, many
would find inappropriate.

Proposed legislation
Without speaking to the merits of the
particular line that Congress may wish to
draw, I nevertheless believe that the legislation introduced into Congress by U.S. Sen.
George V. Voinovich and U.S. Rep. Patrick
J. Tiberi21 makes an excellent start at the
process of drawing such a line.
It represents a considered effort to strike
a balance between the ability of the states,
in their sovereign capacities, to adopt programs designed to attract economic activity
to the state and the needs of the nation to
maintain the national common market that
has been essential to our country’s economic
prosperity.
Although I have studiously avoided
expressing my views as to precisely where
Congress should draw the line, and I have
also expressed the view that the proposed
legislation is in need of some revision, I do
believe that the proposed legislation, which
generally authorizes state tax incentives to
encourage economic development, properly
excludes the following types of state tax discrimination from its authorization:
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